Mastra Runtime
Owns sessions, memory, schedules, workflows, and signal delivery. Storage starts even without a configured model.
Papyrus is a customer-hosted durable agent runtime powered by Mastra. Entra ID is the identity authority. The product surface is a Mastra-native agent runtime with governed plugin lifecycle, offline licensing, sandboxed execution, and zero-inline-secrets architecture.

Scope: potential software control contributions only. These materials are not a FedRAMP authorization, ATO, SSP, certification, or independent assessment. Papyrus is not an authorization to operate, a cross-domain solution, or a claim of GCC High, DoD, IL4, IL6, or SIPR accreditation.
Architecture
Papyrus is a licensed daemon for durable, event-driven agent work. Mastra owns sessions; plugins are adapters; Entra is authoritative.
Owns sessions, memory, schedules, workflows, and signal delivery. Storage starts even without a configured model.
Teams, Exchange email, ACP, A2A, and customer systems are plugins. Disabling them does not disable the runtime.
No local identity system. Six application roles: Integration.View, Integration.Manage, Security.Manage, Action.Approve, Audit.View, System.Owner.
Connector config accepts only customer-vault, certificate, or managed-identity references. Inline tokens and keys are rejected.
Agent code runs only on Linux under Bubblewrap with network denied. Off-host execution is explicitly disabled.
Deployment-bound, signed, offline license format. No Beag cloud callback required. License authorities are customer-pinned.
Governed plugin lifecycle
Credential values never enter model context. The card sends credential references directly to the daemon.
Initial configuration authored by an integration owner
Configuration validated; health checked against the target system
Submitted for review by an Entra-authorized approver
Approved and operational; actions can be released
Health issues detected or explicitly disabled by governance
Components
85
Mapped controls
35
OSCAL version
1.2.1
SBOM generated
8/7/2026
Machine-readable controls
The OSCAL component definition separates behavior provided by Papyrus from configuration, infrastructure, and inherited services owned by the customer.
Mapping status
31
Partial
4
Customer-configured
No mapping is represented as fully implemented or assessed. "Partial" records a potential Papyrus contribution; "customer-configured" depends on the deployed boundary.
papyrus
7
shared
24
customer
3
inherited
1
Papyrus provides project membership, organization membership, invitation, credential, and role records. Deploying organizations remain responsible for identity proofing, account approval, periodic review, disablement policy, and upstream identity-provider lifecycle management.
The daemon enforces authenticated sessions and project-scoped RBAC before protected operations. REST and WebSocket operations are evaluated against the caller identity and assigned project permissions.
Papyrus exposes role-based project permissions and separates ordinary member actions from administrative operations. Customers define role assignments, privileged administrators, and separation-of-duties policy.
Papyrus applies request rate limits to authentication-sensitive endpoints and rejects invalid challenges and credentials. Customers configure upstream IdP, reverse-proxy, and enclave account-lockout thresholds.
Papyrus issues bounded sessions and supports explicit logout and credential revocation workflows. Deployment owners set session lifetime, inactivity, and emergency termination requirements.
Profile-gated authentication supports CAC/PIV for SIPRNet/IL6, CAC/PIV and WebAuthn for NIPRNet/IL4, and WebAuthn, OIDC, or SAML for commercial deployments. Authentication strength depends on customer-selected providers and configuration.
Papyrus binds an externally authenticated identity to a locally generated member public key and records provenance for the binding. Customers remain authoritative for enterprise identifiers and reassignment policy.
Papyrus supports WebAuthn credential enrollment and removal, CAC/PIV certificate validation, OIDC key discovery, and SAML IdP certificates. Customers control certificate issuance, trust anchors, provider keys, recovery, rotation, and revocation.
Commercial deployments may federate external identities through OIDC or SAML. The customer determines whether non-organizational access is permitted and configures federation claims, assurance requirements, and sponsorship.
Papyrus defines security-relevant audit events for authentication, membership, role changes, project lifecycle, canvas mutation, agent and skill execution, export, configuration, and integrity verification.
Audit records identify time, actor, action, target, outcome, project context, and integrity-chain data where applicable. Secrets, raw authenticators, private keys, and bearer tokens are excluded from normal audit content.
Authorized users can retrieve and review project audit history and verify the audit chain. Customers establish review cadence, alert rules, escalation paths, and correlation with enclave monitoring systems.
Papyrus records ISO 8601 timestamps from the host operating system. Accurate, synchronized, and authoritative time is inherited from the deployment platform and must be configured by the customer.
Papyrus uses append-oriented, hash-linked audit records to make modification detectable. Customers protect database files, exports, backups, host access, and external log destinations.
The daemon generates audit records at server-side enforcement points for supported security and business operations, allowing consistent collection regardless of client interface.
Papyrus provides profile-driven defaults for commercial, NIPRNet/IL4, and SIPRNet/IL6 modes. Customers document the approved deployment manifest, operating system, container, network, IdP, model endpoint, service binding, and storage configuration.
Papyrus configuration is file- and environment-driven and can be version controlled. Approval, testing, deployment, rollback, and emergency-change processes are customer operational responsibilities.
Administrative and project permissions restrict application-level changes. Repository, deployment pipeline, host, secret-store, and production configuration access are controlled by the customer.
PAPYRUS_PROFILE gates authentication, model endpoint, internet use, agent availability, and cross-domain features. Customers set secure values and validate them against the authorized environment.
Papyrus can disable agents, external model endpoints, internet-assisted discovery, and cross-domain export by profile. Customers remove unused services, block unnecessary ports, and constrain runtime capabilities.
Papyrus publishes a lockfile and can produce SPDX or CycloneDX SBOMs for application dependencies. Customers add operating system, container, hardware, IdP, database, model server, and infrastructure components.
Papyrus supports explicit service binding, profile-based internet restrictions, authenticated project-scoped WebSocket sessions, and no required public discovery or relay infrastructure. Firewalls, proxies, segmentation, CDS boundaries, and enclave routing remain customer controls.
Browser, API, and realtime WebSocket traffic can use TLS through the authoritative Papyrus service. Customers provision certificates, approved cipher policy, termination architecture, and any required FIPS-validated modules.
Papyrus uses a deployment identity for session and transfer signing, TLS certificates, SAML certificates, OIDC verification keys, trusted deployment identities, and a pinned license authority key. Customers define key custody, approved generation, backup, rotation, revocation, escrow, and destruction.
Papyrus relies on platform cryptographic implementations for TLS, WebAuthn, X.509, token signatures, signed licenses, and QUIC. Algorithm availability does not itself establish FIPS validation; customers select validated modules when required.
Papyrus binds requests to validated session tokens, protects state-changing browser flows with CSRF challenges, validates WebAuthn challenges, and validates OIDC state and PKCE data.
Papyrus stores projects, credentials, audit records, and configuration locally. Encryption at rest is inherited from customer-managed full-disk, volume, database, or platform encryption and associated key management.
Beag Labs tracks application and dependency defects, publishes updated releases, and maintains lockfile changes. Customers define patch windows, test updates, deploy remediations, and document risk acceptance.
Papyrus exposes audit, authentication, collaboration-session, agent, transfer, and integrity events suitable for operational monitoring. Customers collect, retain, correlate, alert on, and respond to those events in their monitoring platform.
Papyrus supports deterministic dependency resolution, signed-license validation, bundle verification, and hash-linked audit verification. Customers verify release provenance, hashes or signatures, container provenance, and deployment integrity.
The daemon validates authentication responses, request bodies, project permissions, cross-domain bundles, node types, and security-sensitive configuration before processing.
Papyrus returns bounded error responses and avoids intentionally exposing private keys, tokens, or internal credential material. Customers configure production logging and reverse proxies to prevent diagnostic leakage.
Software bill of materials
@ai-sdk/openai4.0.34Apache-2.0
@node-saml/node-saml5.1.0MIT
@simplewebauthn/browser10.0.0MIT
@simplewebauthn/server10.0.1MIT
@types/node22.20.1MIT
@xyflow/react12.11.2MIT
ai7.0.56Apache-2.0 + MIT
better-sqlite313.0.3MIT
citty0.1.6MIT
gsap3.15.0Not declared
react18.3.1MIT
react-dom18.3.1MIT
ws8.21.2MIT
@ai-sdk/gateway4.0.44Apache-2.0
@ai-sdk/provider4.0.6Apache-2.0
@ai-sdk/provider-utils5.0.23Apache-2.0 + BSD-3-Clause + ISC
@hexagon/base641.1.28MIT
@levischuck/tiny-cbor0.2.11MIT
@peculiar/asn1-android2.8.0MIT
@peculiar/asn1-ecc2.8.0MIT
@peculiar/asn1-rsa2.8.0MIT
@peculiar/asn1-schema2.8.0MIT
@peculiar/asn1-x5092.8.0MIT
@simplewebauthn/types10.0.0MIT
@types/debug4.1.13MIT
@types/qs6.15.1MIT
@types/xml-encryption1.2.4MIT
@types/xml2js0.4.14MIT
@xmldom/is-dom-node1.0.1MIT
@xmldom/xmldom0.8.13MIT
@xyflow/system0.0.79MIT
classcat5.0.5MIT
consola3.4.2MIT
cross-fetch4.1.0MIT
debug4.4.3MIT
loose-envify1.4.0MIT
node-addon-api8.9.1MIT
scheduler0.23.2MIT
undici-types6.21.0MIT
xml-crypto6.1.2MIT
xml-encryption3.1.0MIT
xml2js0.6.2MIT
xmlbuilder15.1.1MIT
xpath0.0.34MIT
zod4.4.3MIT
zustand4.5.7MIT
@peculiar/utils2.0.3MIT
@standard-schema/spec1.1.0MIT
@types/d3-drag3.0.7MIT
@types/d3-interpolate3.0.4MIT
@types/d3-selection3.0.11MIT
@types/d3-transition3.0.9MIT
@types/d3-zoom3.0.8MIT
@types/ms2.1.0MIT
@vercel/oidc3.2.0Apache-2.0
@workflow/serde4.1.0Apache-2.0
asn1js3.0.10BSD-3-Clause
d3-drag3.0.0ISC
d3-interpolate3.0.1ISC
d3-selection3.0.0ISC
d3-zoom3.0.0ISC
escape-html1.0.3MIT
eventsource-parser3.1.0MIT
js-tokens4.0.0MIT
json-schema0.4.0AFL-2.1 + BSD-3-Clause
ms2.1.3MIT
node-fetch2.7.0MIT
sax1.6.1BlueOak-1.0.0
tslib2.8.10BSD
undici7.29.0MIT
use-sync-external-store1.6.0MIT
xmlbuilder11.0.1MIT
xpath0.0.32MIT
xpath0.0.33MIT
@types/d3-color3.1.3MIT
d3-color3.1.0ISC
d3-dispatch3.0.1ISC
d3-transition3.0.1ISC
pvtsutils1.3.6MIT
pvutils1.2.0MIT
whatwg-url5.0.0MIT
d3-ease3.0.1BSD-3-Clause
d3-timer3.0.1ISC
tr460.0.3MIT
webidl-conversions3.0.1BSD-2-ClauseComponent names, versions, and declared licenses are read from the published CycloneDX SBOM. Project links are taken from each component's repository metadata, with npm as the fallback. Marks identify their respective projects or maintainers and do not imply endorsement.
Deployment alignment
Alignment describes supported deployment profiles and documented mappings—not government approval or authorization.

Customer-managed controlled environment profile

Customer-managed classified environment profile

35 documented control mappings
OSCAL 1.2.1 · v0.2.0
CycloneDX 1.7 · 85 components
Dependency licenses and notices · PDF
SPDX 2.3 · 85 packages
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